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Abstract
A risk analyst assesses potential financial losses based on multiple sources of information.
Often, the assessment does not only depend on the specification of the loss random variable, but
also various economic scenarios. Motivated by this observation, we design a unified axiomatic
framework for risk evaluation principles which quantifies jointly a loss random variable and a set
of plausible probabilities. We call such an evaluation principle a generalized risk measure. We
present a series of relevant theoretical results. The worst-case, coherent, and robust generalized
risk measures are characterized via different sets of intuitive axioms. We establish the equivalence
between a few natural forms of law invariance in our framework, and the technical subtlety
therein reveals a sharp contrast between our framework and the traditional one. Moreover,
coherence and strong law invariance are derived from a combination of other conditions, which
provides additional support for coherent risk measures such as Expected Shortfall over Value-
at-Risk, a relevant issue for risk management practice.
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1 Introduction
Risk measures are widely used in both financial regulation and economic decisions. Since the
seminal work of Artzner et al. (1999), risk measures are commonly defined as functionals on a space
of random variables, or, with the assumption of law invariance, on the set of their distribution
functions. The most popular risk measures are the Value-at-Risk (VaR) and the Expected Shortfall
(ES); see Artzner et al. (1999) and Föllmer and Schied (2016) for the classic theory of risk measures,
and documents from the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), e.g., BCBS (2019), for
regulatory practice in banking.
In this paper, we propose a novel framework for measures of risk under uncertainty. Let us first
explain our motivation. We take market risk as our primary example, although our discussions
naturally apply to many other types of risks. A portfolio is associated with a future loss random
variable X representing the portfolio risk. The loss X has two important practical aspects: the
specification and the modeling.
1. The specification refers to how X is defined in terms of the underlying risk factors (e.g., asset
prices, exchange rates, credit scores, volatilities, etc). More precisely, X is the financial loss (or
gain) from holding assets, derivatives, or other investments in the portfolio. Mathematically,
the specification of X is represented by the function X : Ω → R, which maps each state of
the future financial world (each element of the sample space Ω) into a realized loss.
2. The modeling refers to the statistical assessment of the likelihood and the severity of the loss
X. The modeling of X is usually summarized by a distribution, or a collection of distributions
in case of model uncertainty, under some estimated or hypothetical (e.g., in stress testing)
probability measures P ∈ P, where P is the set of probability measures on the sample space
Ω.
In the classic framework of Artzner et al. (1999), a risk measure ρ is defined on a set X of random
variables, and the risk value ρ(X) is thereby determined by the specification of X. The modeling
of X is, however, implicit in this setting: through a given probability P, assuming available to the
end-user, the distribution of X under P is determined by its specification.
There is a visible gap in the classic setting ρ : X → R. In practice, neither X nor P is generally
fixed. A change in X means adjusting positions via trading financial securities. A change in P
means an update of the modeling, estimation, and calibration of the random world. In financial
practice, both X and P evolve on a daily basis for a trading desk; yet they are modified daily for
very different reasons.
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For another concrete example, suppose that a regulator specifies a risk measure (e.g., ES at level
0.975 as in BCBS (2019)), and two firms assess the risk of the same portfolio separately. Due to
different modeling and data processing techniques used by the two firms, their reported ES values
are typically not the same. However, the loss random variable X from the portfolio is the same for
both firms. Therefore, the risk measure should not be only determined by the specification of X,
but also the modeling information. In practice, modeling is always subject to uncertainty (called
ambiguity in decision theory). Even in the simple estimation of a parametric model, the plausible
models are not unique; see Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) for a classic treatment of ambiguity.
Motivated by the above observations, we propose a new framework of risk measures taking into
account both the specification and the modeling of random losses. We choose a set of probability
measures instead of a single probability measure as the input for the modeling component. Formally,
we introduce the generalized risk measure Ψ : X × 2P → [−∞,∞], which has two input arguments:
a random variable X ∈ X representing the specification of the loss, and a set of probability measures
Q ⊆ P representing the modeling of the random world; each probability measure in P is called
a scenario. Our framework includes the traditional risk measure as a special case when Q is a
singleton, and when Q is fixed but not a singleton, our generalized risk measure can be seen as
a scenario-based risk measure of Wang and Ziegel (2021). The framework also incorporates other
complicated decision criteria addressing model uncertainty in the literature, which will be discussed
later.
We take the perspective of a regulator, who designs a regulatory capital assessment scheme that
will be complied with by financial institutions. Financial institutions (or their trading desks) can
choose their portfolio positions with losses X ∈ X , and, subject to passing regulatory backtests
for statistical prudence, they can also choose their internal models Q ⊆ P. The generalized risk
measure is crucial to the design of the capital assessment procedure, because it acts on portfolios
and models from the financial institutions, and computes regulatory capital requirement. Therefore,
our theoretical framework closely resembles the regulatory practice in the Fundamental Review of
the Trading Book (FRTB) of BCBS (2019); see Wang and Ziegel (2021) for discussions on the risk
assessment practice of FRTB, and Cambou and Filipovic (2017) for model and scenario aggregation
methods in solvency assessment. It is important to note that the input scenario set Q does not
necessarily contain the decision maker’s subjective probability governing the random world, because
most models are simplifications or approximations, as argued by Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2021).
Figure 1 illustrates a stylized risk assessment procedure, reflecting many of the above con-


































Figure 1: A stylized procedure for risk assessment practice
(internal), and model risk manager (internal). In Figure 1, except for the regulator’s actions, the
other actions are changing dynamically on a daily (or similar) basis, making it clear that one should
take both Q and X as inputs and allow them to vary in a unified framework.
1.1 Contribution and structure of the paper
As explained above, in the literature on the axiomatic theory of risk measures, one often first
designs axioms to identify desirable risk measures without model uncertainty, and then puts model
uncertainty into the model as an exogenous object. This approach, although easy to apply, is
unsatisfactory from a decision-theoretic point of view, as it does not identify desirable axioms for
risk measures when model uncertainty is taken as an input. One of our main contributions is to
provide an axiomatic framework of generalized risk measures which allows us to consider properties
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on both the model uncertainty and the random losses, thus addressing this practical issue for the
first time. The rigorous mathematical formulation of generalized risk measures is laid out in Section
2.
Since generalized risk measures are defined as a mapping from X × 2P to the (extended) real
line, the mathematical structure is much more complicated than traditional risk measures. We
establish several relevant theoretical results related to this new framework. In Section 3, we obtain
an axiomatic characterization of worst-case generalized risk measures via some simple properties
(Theorem 1). The worst-case generalized risk measures are the most practical and they appear
extensively in the literature of risk measure and optimization.
Law invariance is a crucial property that connects loss random variables to statistical models. In
the traditional framework, law-invariant risk measures can be equivalently expressed as functionals
on a space of distributions; this is no longer true in our generalized framework. We provide three
different forms of law invariance which reflect different considerations: strong law invariance, loss
law invariance, and scenario law invariance; see Section 4 for details. In general, the three notions of
law invariance are not equivalent and they reflect very different modeling considerations. Indeed, if
strong law invariance is assumed, our framework can be converted to the traditional setting without
many mathematical difficulties. However, in practice, strong law invariance may not be desirable,
and technical complications arise when it has to be weakened. In Section 4, we show the equivalence
between strong law invariance and a combination of the two weaker versions of law invariance under
mild conditions (Theorem 2). Moreover, we express the worst-case generalized risk measures with
various kinds of law invariance as functions defined on the distributions (Proposition 2). Therefore,
from traditional risk measures defined on distributions, we can easily construct generalized risk
measures satisfying certain desirable properties.
In Section 5, we focus on coherent generalized risk measures, an analogue to the coherent
traditional risk measures of Artzner et al. (1999), and characterize the simplest form (expectation-
type) in Theorem 3. Moreover, we propose the notion of ambiguity sensitivity, and establish
an equivalence between strong law invariance and a combination of a weaker law invariance and
ambiguity sensitivity (Theorem 4). In addition, the combination, with a few simple properties,
implies coherence, which supports coherent risk measures in the traditional framework from a
completely novel angle.
In Section 6, we discuss some connections of our framework to decision theory. Particularly, we
characterize the multi-prior expected utility of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) with several properties
(Proposition 3) and obtain an axiomatic characterization for the robust generalized risk measure
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(Proposition 4), closely related to the variational preferences of Maccheroni et al. (2006). Section
7 contains further discussions and remarks. Proofs of all theorems and propositions are put in the
appendix.
1.2 Connections to other frameworks in the literature
Our framework is in sharp contrast to the existing ones in the literature of risk management.
We have already discussed the difference between our framework and the classic frameworks of
risk measures (see Artzner et al. (1999) and Föllmer and Schied (2016)) or preferences (see Wakker
(2010) for a comprehensive treatment), which are all defined on X . The setting of scenario-based
risk measures of Wang and Ziegel (2021) is conceptually close to ours and also motivated by the
regulatory framework of BCBS (2019), but mathematically quite different. Scenario-based risk
measures are mappings on X determined by the distributions of random losses under a collection of
pre-specified scenarios. Since the scenarios are fixed, the key question of how a risk measure reacts
when scenarios change is left unaddressed.
Model uncertainty is an important topic in economic decision theory. In the classic setting of
Anscombe and Aumann (1963), a risk (called a lottery) is represented by a collection of possible
distributions, whereas in our framework, the input consists of a random variable and a collection of
probability measures, which interact with each other. There are many recent developments in this
stream of literature, which focus on characterization of preferences under uncertainty via some ax-
ioms. For a non-exclusive list, we mention the multi-prior expected utility of Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1989), the multiplier preferences of Hansen and Sargent (2001), the smooth ambiguity preference
of Klibanoff et al. (2005), the variational preference of Maccheroni et al. (2006), and the model
misspecification preference of Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2021). They can be formulated as examples of
our framework, which will be illustrated in Example 5.
Some conceptual frameworks in decision theory reflect similar considerations towards risk and
uncertainty as ours. In particular, Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2021) studied preferences under model
misspecification, and their set of structured models corresponds to our set of scenarios Q. An
earlier work closely related to our framework is Gajdos et al. (2008), where the authors studied
preferences defined on the outcome mapping (an act) and the set of possible probabilities; thus
conceptual similarity is clear. Nevertheless, since the main context of our work is financial risk
assessment instead of decision making, the axioms and properties considered in this paper, as well
as technical results and their implications, are completely different from Gajdos et al. (2008) and
Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2021).
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In the operations research literature, Delage et al. (2019) recently investigated a model for
decision making with and without uncertainty, and analyzed the conditions under which random
decisions are strictly better than deterministic ones. Model uncertainty also widely appears in robust
optimization; see El Ghaoui et al. (2003), Zhu and Fukushima (2009) and Zymler et al. (2013) for
optimizing risk measures under uncertainty. In the above literature, model uncertainty is generally
pre-specified and regarded as an objective fact, whereas we study the properties of risk measures
taking model uncertainty as an input argument that can vary over all possible choices.
2 A framework for measures of risk and uncertainty
2.1 Notation
We begin by stating some notation which will be used throughout. Let (Ω,F) be a measurable
space and let P be the class of atomless probability measures defined on the measurable space.1
The set of all subsets of P is denoted by 2P . Let X be the space of bounded random variables,
and M be the set of compactly supported distributions on R. For X,Y ∈ X and P,Q ∈ P, we
write X|P
d
= Y |Q if the distribution of X under P is identical to that of Y under Q. We denote by
FX|P ∈ M the distribution of X under P . For an increasing set function ν : F → R with ν(∅) = 0,





(ν(X > x)− ν(Ω)) dx+
∫ ∞
0
ν(X > x) dx, X ∈ X .
2.2 A new and generalized framework for risk measures
Traditionally, risk measures in the sense of Artzner et al. (1999) and Föllmer and Schied (2016)
are mappings from X to R. We will call them traditional risk measures.
In the new framework that we work with in this paper, the input of a risk measure is a combina-
tion of the loss X and a set of possible probability measures Q that represents the best knowledge
of the underlying random nature. To distinguish from the traditional setting, we shall refer to these
functionals as generalized risk measures.
Definition 1. A generalized risk measure2 is a mapping Ψ : X × 2P → [−∞,∞]. The generalized
risk measure Ψ is called standard if Ψ(s|Q) = s for all s ∈ R and Q ⊆ P. A single-scenario risk
measure is a mapping Ψ : X × P → [−∞,∞].
1A probability measure P on (Ω,F) is atomless if there exists a uniform random variable on (Ω,F , P ).
2We use the notation Ψ(X|Q) instead of Ψ(X,Q) to emphasize the different roles of X ∈ X and Q ∈ 2P .
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Clearly, a single-scenario risk measure is precisely a generalized risk measure with its second
argument confined to singletons of scenarios. For a singleton {P} ⊆ P, we use the simpler notation
Ψ(X|P ) = Ψ(X|{P}). For a fixed Q, Ψ(·|Q) is a risk measure in the traditional sense.
The requirement of standardization reflects the consideration that, for any fixed constant s,
there is no uncertainty associated with it, and Ψ(s|Q) should not depend on the input scenarios Q.
The range of Ψ is chosen as [−∞,∞] in our general framework to allow for the greatest generality.
In practical applications, one may restrict the range to be R or (−∞,∞].
Generalized risk measures are much more complicated as a mathematical object than traditional
risk measures, since their input includes both a random loss X and a set of probability measures
Q. Below we collect some basic properties to consider for a generalized risk measure Ψ.
(A1) Uncertainty aversion: Ψ(X|Q) 6 Ψ(X|R) for all X ∈ X and Q ⊆ R ⊆ P.
(A2) Scenario monotonicity: Ψ(X|Q) 6 Ψ(Y |Q) if Ψ(X|P ) 6 Ψ(Y |P ) for all P ∈ Q.
(A3) Scenario upper bound: Ψ(X|Q) 6 supP∈QΨ(X|P ) for all X ∈ X and Q ⊆ P.
Property (A1) means that the evaluation of the risk weakly increases if model uncertainty increases,
and this reflects an aversion to model uncertainty. Property (A2) means that, if under each possible
scenario, X is evaluated to be less risky than Y , then the overall evaluation of the risk of X should
not be more than Y . Property (A3) means that the overall evaluation of X is not more extreme
than X evaluated under the worst-case scenario.
(A2) and (A3) are quite natural and they are satisfied by most examples of generalized risk
measures in their various disguises in the risk management and decision theory literature; we will
discuss some of them later.
Property (A1) is more specialized, as it will lead to worst-case risk evaluation or decision making
(Theorem 1 below) axiomatized in decision theory by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). This property
is not satisfied in models where uncertainty is aggregated in some form of averaging, such as taking a
weighted average of risk evaluates such as the average ES of Wang and Ziegel (2021) or the smooth
ambiguity model of Klibanoff et al. (2005). Indeed, if a new scenario P is added to an existing
collection of scenarios Q, and a random loss X is considered safe under P , then it may be desirable
in risk management practice to reduce the assessment of riskiness of X by including P , that is,
Ψ(X|{Q, P}) < Ψ(X|Q), violating (A1).
In decision theory, after a proper translation between two frameworks, the preferential version
of (A2) appears in Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2021) as Q-separability, and (A1) is genuinely weaker
than monotonicity in model ambiguity of Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2021) on preferences. For a fixed
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set of scenarios Q, (A1) and (A2) are, respectively, similar to ambiguity aversion and ambiguity
monotonicity in Delage et al. (2019), which are formulated for distributions rather than random
variables.
2.3 Examples: VaR and ES
We first give a few examples in this section, and more will be discussed later. The two popular
traditional risk measures in banking and insurance are the Value-at-Risk (VaR) and the Expected
Shortfall (ES); see Embrechts et al. (2014) for a review. Both risk measures in the classic for-
mulation are defined with a fixed scenario P ∈ P, and allowing P to vary we can treat them as
single-scenario risk measures in Definition 1. For a level α ∈ (0, 1], the VaR under P is defined as
VaRα(X|P ) = inf{x ∈ R : P (X 6 x) > α}, X ∈ X ,






VaRβ(X|P ) dβ, X ∈ X .
We first show some properties of VaR and ES in our setting. These properties follow from
existing properties of VaR and ES with a fixed P , but the concavity or convexity with respect to
scenarios is not formally studied in the literature since our framework is new.
Proposition 1. Fix α ∈ (0, 1). The single-scenario risk measure (X,P ) 7→ ESα(X|P ) is convex in
X and concave in P , whereas (X,P ) 7→ VaRα(X|P ) is neither convex nor concave in X or P .
Building on the single-scenario VaR and ES, we can define generalized risk measures such as
worst-case VaR and worst-case ES, via
VaRα(X|Q) = sup
P∈Q
VaRα(X|P ) and ESα(X|Q) = sup
P∈Q
ESα(X|P ), (X,Q) ∈ X × 2
P .
We refer to El Ghaoui et al. (2003) for optimization of the worst-case VaR, Zhu and Fukushima
(2009) for optimization of the worst-case ES, and Wang and Ziegel (2021) for their theoretical
properties. The worst-case VaR and the worst-case ES are both standard, and they satisfy (A1),
(A2) and (A3).
For a given fixed Q ⊆ P, several other examples of ES and VaR with aggregated scenarios, such
as averages (with respect to a pre-specified measure over Q) and inf-convolutions (for a finite Q),
are also considered by Wang and Ziegel (2021) and Castagnoli et al. (2021). For instance, we can
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where µQ is a measure over Q for each Q ⊆ P. The average ES in (1) is standard and it satisfies (A2)
and (A3); it does not satisfy (A1) in general. We remark that, although sharing many common forms
and examples, our framework is fundamentally different from the existing ones in the literature, as
it is crucial for a generalized risk measure to use Q as an input variable instead of a pre-specified
collection.
3 Worst-case generalized risk measures
In this section, we present our first theoretical result, a characterization of generalized risk
measures satisfying (A1) as the supremum of risk measures in the traditional sense. This result
allows us to apply many results on traditional risk measures to generalized risk measures.
Theorem 1. For a generalized risk measure Ψ : X × 2P → R:
(i) Suppose that Ψ is standard. Ψ satisfies (A1)-(A2) if and only if it admits a representation
Ψ(X|Q) = sup
P∈Q
Ψ(X|P ), (X,Q) ∈ X × 2P . (2)
(ii) Ψ satisfies (A1) and (A3) if and only if it admits a representation (2).
Using Theorem 1, we can pin down the forms of possible generalized risk measures with prop-
erties on the simpler object Ψ(X|P ) for X ∈ X and P ∈ P. Theorem 1 is a general functional form
of the specific preferential characterization treated in Theorem 2 of Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2021).
Definition 2. For a given generalized risk measure Ψ, the single-scenario risk measure (X,P ) 7→
Ψ(X|P ) is called the core of Ψ.
By Theorem 1, the cores one-to-one correspond to standard generalized risk measures that
satisfy (A1)-(A2) via (2). Note that in general, the core of Ψ does not determine Ψ on X × 2P , if
the conditions in Theorem 1 are not satisfied.
In case (2) holds, we say that the core Ψ on X × P induces the generalized risk measure Ψ on
X × 2P . Many results in this paper are stated for cores instead of the generalized risk measure.
Nevertheless, when we speak of cores, we do not need to assume the worst-case form (2) or any of
(A1)-(A3).
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Some simple examples for the worst-case generalized risk measures are collected below, and they
appear in forms similar to those in the classic theory of risk measures.
Example 1. (i) The expectation core
Ψ(X|P ) = EP [X], (X,P ) ∈ X × P




P [X], (X,Q) ∈ X × 2P .
For a fixed Q, Ψ(·|Q) is the robust representation of a traditional coherent risk measure of
Artzner et al. (1999). This class of risk measures is the most well studied in the literature,
and we will pay special attention to it in Section 5.
(ii) Let γ : P → R be a non-constant function on P. The penalized-mean core
Ψ(X|P ) = EP [X] − γ(P ), (X,P ) ∈ X × P
induces the generalized risk measure
Ψ(X|Q) = sup
P∈Q
{EP [X]− γ(P )}, (X,Q) ∈ X × 2P .
For a fixed Q, Ψ(·|Q) is the robust representation of a traditional convex risk measure of
Föllmer and Schied (2016).
(iii) For α ∈ (0, 1), the VaR core (X,P ) 7→ VaRα(X|P ) induces the worst-case VaR in Section 2.3.
(iv) For α ∈ (0, 1), the ES core (X,P ) 7→ ESα(X|P ) induces the worst-case ES in Section 2.3.
4 Three formulations of law invariance
For a given P , the functional X 7→ Ψ(X|P ) is a traditional risk measure, and properties can
be imposed for this traditional risk measure. The more interesting and non-trivial question is the
interplay between X and P for the core Ψ, which we will address below. Since P ∈ P is interpreted
as a scenario for us to generate a statistical model for the loss X, the evaluation of the risk should
depend on the distribution of X. Motivated by this consideration, we can consider three forms of
11
law invariance on the generalized risk measure Ψ or its core:3
(B1) Strong law invariance: Ψ(X|P ) = Ψ(Y |Q) for X,Y ∈ X and P,Q ∈ P with X|P
d
= Y |Q.
(B2) Loss law invariance: Ψ(X|P ) = Ψ(Y |P ) for X,Y ∈ X and P ∈ P with X|P
d
= Y |P .
(B3) Scenario law invariance: Ψ(X|P ) = Ψ(X|Q) for X ∈ X and P,Q ∈ P with X|P
d
= X|Q.
Clearly, (B1) is stronger than both (B2) and (B3). Each of (B1), (B2) and (B3) reflects the
consideration that the probability measures P in Ψ(X|P ) is used to model the distribution of the
loss X. More precisely, (B1) is an agreement of risk assessment for the same distribution across
different scenarios and different losses, whereas (B2) only yields the agreement for each particular
scenario, and (B3) only yields the agreement for each particular loss. The following example shows
that (B1), (B2) and (B3) are genuinely different concepts.
Example 2. (i) The cores in Example 1 (i), (iii) and (iv) are strongly law-invariant.
(ii) The core in Example 1 (ii) is loss law-invariant, but generally not scenario law-invariant.
(iii) Let β : X → R be a non-constant function on X . The core
Ψ(X|P ) = EP [X]− β(X), (X,P ) ∈ X × P
is scenario law-invariant, but generally not loss law-invariant.
Since (B1) implies both (B2) and (B3), one may wonder whether (B2) and (B3) jointly imply
(B1), which turns out to be a tricky question. In other words, we aim to show from (B2) and
(B3) that Ψ(X|P ) = Ψ(Y |Q) holds for P,Q ∈ P and X,Y ∈ X satisfying X|P
d
= Y |Q. Denote
by F the distribution of X under P , which is the same as that of Y under Q. If there exists
Z ∈ X which has distribution F under both P and Q, then we have the desired chain of equalities
Ψ(X|P ) = Ψ(Z|P ) = Ψ(Z|Q) = Ψ(Y |Q). Unfortunately, the existence of such Z depends on
the specification of P,Q and it cannot be expected in general; this problem is non-trivial and has
been studied in detail by Shen et al. (2019). In the result below, we show that, under the extra
assumption that the measurable space (Ω,F) is standard Borel (i.e., isomorphic to the Borel space
on [0, 1]), it is possible to find an intermediate measure R and two random variables Z,W ∈ X such
3In this paper, all properties (Ax) reflect how Ψ reacts to Q, all properties (Bx) reflect how Ψ reacts to the
distributions of the risk, all properties (Cx) reflect consideration for Ψ in terms of a traditional risk measure, all
properties (Dx) are relevant to a mapping defined on the set of measures P , and all properties (Ex) reflect consideration
on decision-theoretic preference.
12












holds, and it gives the desired statement Ψ(X|P ) = Ψ(Y |Q) needed for (B1).
Theorem 2. For a core Ψ, (B1) implies both (B2) and (B3). If (Ω,F) is standard Borel, then
(B2) and (B3) together are equivalent to (B1).
Remark 1. It remains unclear whether the equivalence (B2+B3)⇔(B1) holds if (Ω,F) is not stan-
dard Borel. For applications in finance and risk management, it is typically sufficient to use a
standard Borel space, because one can construct countably many independent Brownian motions
on the corresponding probability space. The assumption of a standard Borel space is used in some
classic literature on risk measures, e.g., Delbaen (2002) and Jouini et al. (2006).
Loss law invariance (B2) seems to be always desirable to assume in practice, because if two
random losses X and Y share the same distribution under a chosen scenario P of interest, then
it is natural to assign the same risk value to these two losses. For a fixed collection Q ∈ 2P , this
property defines a Q-based risk measure of Wang and Ziegel (2021). On the other hand, it may
not always be desirable to assume (B3); although two scenarios may give the same distribution of
a loss X, the riskiness may not be understood as the same, as illustrated by the following example.
Example 3 ((B3) is not always desirable). Let P represent a good economic scenario, and Q
represent an adverse economic scenario (e.g., COVID-19). Assume that the distribution of X is
the same under P and Q, which means that X is independent of the particular economic factor
which generates P and Q. The value Ψ(X|P ) quantifies the riskiness of X when P is the chosen
scenario, and Ψ(X|Q) quantifies the riskiness of X when Q is the chosen scenario. Since P is a
better economy, the risk manager may think that X is more acceptable in this situation, leading to
Ψ(X|P ) < Ψ(X|Q). For instance, the core in Example 1 (ii), the robust representation of convex
risk measures, reflects this consideration, and it is not scenario law-invariant.
Next, we collect some representation results based on (A1), (A3) and (B1)-(B3). Throughout,
we define
Σ = {ψ : M → [−∞,∞]}.
Each mapping ψ ∈ Σ represents a traditional law-invariant risk measure treated as a functional on
M instead of on X .
Proposition 2. Let Ψ be a generalized risk measure.
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(i) Ψ satisfies (A1), (A3) and (B1) if and only if there exists ψ ∈ Σ such that
Ψ(X|Q) = sup
P∈Q
ψ(FX|P ), (X,Q) ∈ X × 2
P .
(ii) Ψ satisfies (A1), (A3) and (B2) if and only if there exists {ψP : P ∈ P} ⊆ Σ such that
Ψ(X|Q) = sup
P∈Q
ψP (FX|P ), (X,Q) ∈ X × 2
P .
(iii) Ψ satisfies (A1), (A3) and (B3) if and only if there exists {ψX : X ∈ X} ⊆ Σ such that
Ψ(X|Q) = sup
P∈Q
ψX(FX|P ), (X,Q) ∈ X × 2
P .
5 Coherent generalized risk measures
In this section, we pay special attention to the most important class of traditional risk measures:
coherent risk measures of Artzner et al. (1999). We first provide a characterization for a generalized
risk measure to have the form of coherent risk measures in Example 1, and then we discuss a few
additional properties that are specific to our setting.
5.1 A characterization for coherent risk measures
We give a simple characterization of the coherent risk measures in Example 1 (i). Coherent
risk measures including ES (for a fixed scenario) are the most well-studied class of risk measures
in the finance and engineering literature. We first list some properties of traditional risk measures
of Artzner et al. (1999) and Föllmer and Schied (2016). These properties are formulated for the
traditional risk measure X 7→ Ψ(X|Q) on X for each fixed Q ⊆ P, and we denote this by ΨQ.
(C1) Monotonicity: ΨQ(X) 6 ΨQ(Y ) for all X,Y ∈ X with X 6 Y ;
(C2) Cash-additivity: ΨQ(X +m) = ΨQ(X) +m for all X ∈ X and m ∈ R;
(C3) Positive homogeneity: ΨQ(λX) = λΨQ(X) for all λ > 0 and X ∈ X ;
(C4) Subadditivity: ΨQ(X + Y ) 6 ΨQ(X) + ΨQ(Y ) for all X,Y ∈ X .
Following the terminology for traditional risk measures, a generalized risk measure Ψ is monetary
if it satisfies (C1)-(C2) and coherent if it satisfies (C1)-(C4). We further state a strong property
imposed on the cores.
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(C0) Additivity of the core: Ψ(X + Y |P ) = Ψ(X|P ) + Ψ(Y |P ) for all X,Y ∈ X and P ∈ P.
The property (C0) will be a key property to pin down the form of coherent traditional risk measures.
Theorem 3. A standard generalized risk measure Ψ satisfies (A1), (A2), (B2), (C1) and (C0) if




P [X], (X,Q) ∈ X × 2P . (3)
Moreover, Ψ in (3) satisfies (C2)-(C4).
The most important property used in Theorem 3 is the additivity of the core (C0), which may
be seen as quite strong. As a primary example of coherent risk measures of the form (3) in finan-
cial practice, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) uses (3) to determine margin requirements
for portfolio of instruments; see McNeil et al. (2015, p.64). In the CME approach, under each
fixed scenario, the risk factors move in a particular deterministic way, and hence the portfolio loss
assessment is additive; thus (C0) is natural in this context.
5.2 Ambiguity sensitivity and comonotonic additive risk measures
As we have seen from Example 2, strong law invariance (B1) is genuinely stronger than the
weaker notions of (B2) and (B3). In the following result, we connect weak and strong law invariance
via an additional property on the generalized risk measure Ψ via its core.
(B4) Ambiguity sensitivity: For X ∈ X , P,Q ∈ P and λ ∈ [0, 1], Ψ(X|λP+(1−λ)Q) > λΨ(X|P )+
(1−λ)Ψ(X|Q). Moreover, Ψ(1A|λP +(1−λ)Q) = λΨ(1A|P )+ (1−λ)Ψ(1A|Q) for all A ∈ F
such that P (A) = Q(A).
The first statement of (B4) intuitively means that, due to ambiguity on the distribution of X, the
risk of X under a mixture is larger than the mixture of its risks under P and Q; this is the concavity
in P in Proposition 1. For instance, for a random variable X which is constant under both P and
Q, it may be random (Bernoulli) under λP + (1 − λ)Q, and hence its risk should be larger under
the mixture than under the individual scenarios. Regarding the second statement of (B4), if the
probability measures P and Q agree on how likely event A is, then there is no ambiguity on A, and
its risk under a mixture should be simply a mixture of its risks under P and Q. Another explanation
may be illustrated by the following example.
Example 4 (Ambiguity sensitivity). Assume that P is used by a risk analyst and Q is used by
another risk analyst. The manager would like to use λP +(1−λ)Q, a mixture of P and Q, to reflect
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the knowledge of both analysts. For simplicity, the random loss X is assumed to be an indicator of a
loss event A. If P and Q give different assessments of the probability of A, then the manager would
be worried about the discrepancy in the models, and her final risk assessment Ψ(X|λP + (1−λ)Q)
is more than λΨ(X|P ) + (1 − λ)Ψ(X|Q), the weighted average of the two analysts’ assessments.
On the other hand, if P and Q give the same probability of A, then there is no disagreement in
predicting A. In this case, her risk assessment of 1A is the same as the weighted average of the two
analysts’ assessments.
Another property that is essential to our next characterization result is comonotonic additivity,
which is intimately linked to Choquet integrals; see e.g., Wang et al. (2020).
(C5) Comonotonic additivity: ΨQ(X+Y ) = ΨQ(X)+ΨQ(Y ), for all X,Y ∈ X which are comono-
tonic.4
The following result characterizes loss law-invariant risk measures with ambiguity sensitivity,
which turns out to be equivalent to strongly law-invariant risk measures without this assumption.
The proof of this result is quite technical and it relies on Lyapunov’s convexity theorem, as well as
a few characterization results on Choquet integrals in Wang et al. (2020).
Theorem 4. For a core Ψ, the following are equivalent:
(i) Ψ is loss law-invariant, ambiguity sensitive, monetary, and comonotonic additive, i.e., Ψ
satisfies (B2), (B4), (C1), (C2) and (C5).
(ii) Ψ is strongly law-invariant, coherent, and comonotonic additive, i.e., Ψ satisfies (B1) and
(C1)-(C5).




X d(h ◦ P ), (X,P ) ∈ X × P. (4)
There has been an extensive debate in both academia and industry on whether subadditivity
(C4) proposed by Artzner et al. (1999) is a good criterion for risk measures used in regulatory
practice, as (C4) is key property which distinguishes VaR and ES; see Embrechts et al. (2018,
2021) and the reference therein. By Theorem 4, from the perspective of multiple models, we can
obtain (C4) by using ambiguity sensitivity (B4). Hence, our framework and results offer a novel
decision-theoretic reason to support coherent risk measures (in particular, ES over VaR) without
directly assuming subadditivity (C4).
4Two random variables X and Y are comonotonic (X(ω)−X(ω′))(Y (ω)− Y (ω′)) > 0 for all (ω,ω′) ∈ Ω× Ω.
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6 Connection to decision theory
In this section, we discuss the connection of our generalized risk measures to classic notions
in decision theory, as model uncertainty has been dealt with extensively in the decision theoretic
literature, and traditional risk measures are intimately linked to decision preferences in various
forms; see e.g., Drapeau and Kupper (2013). We first present a list of decision-theoretic criteria
as examples to our framework, followed by characterization results of two classic notions: the
multi-prior expected utility of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) and the variational preferences of
Maccheroni et al. (2006).
6.1 Examples of generalized risk measures in decision theory
Our framework includes many criteria in decision theory as typical examples. Although the con-
siderations of these criteria are different from our paper, the following examples show the generality
of our framework.










where u is a strictly increasing utility function.





P [u(X)] − γ(P )
)
,
where u is a strictly increasing utility function and γ : P → [−∞,∞) is a penalty function.
The multiplier preferences of Hansen and Sargent (2001) correspond to a special choice of γ
which is the Kullback–Leibler divergence from a reference scenario.
(iii) Let Q ⊆ P be pre-specified and µ be a probability measure on Q. The smooth ambiguity















where u is a strictly increasing utility function and φ is a strictly increasing function. Note
that in this formulation, µ needs to be specified with Q, and hence it should be considered as
an input of Ψ in our framework; see Section 7 for more discussion on this.
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where u is a strictly increasing utility function and φ is a selecting function (assumed to exist)
reflecting the decision maker’s attitude to imprecision.











where u is a strictly increasing utility function and c is a distance on the set of measures which
penalizes the model misspecification.
6.2 Multi-prior expected utilities
Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) proposed the notion of multi-prior expected utility in decision
theory. Motivated by the multi-prior expected utility, we consider a preference on X × S which
is represented by a total pre-order , where S is the collection of all finite subsets of P. For
tractability, we consider S, all the finite subsets of P, instead of 2P in this subsection. The decision
is to compare a risk and a set of scenarios with another risk and another set of scenarios. This
setting was studied by Gajdos et al. (2008). We denote by ≃ the equivalence under this preference.
As above, we use (X,P ) if the set of scenarios has only one element P . For decisions among
(X1,Q1), (X2,Q2) ∈ X × S, we propose the following axioms similar to what we have seen so far
in this paper, but defined for preferences instead of generalized risk measures.
(E1) Strong law invariance: (X,P ) ≃ (Y,Q) for any P,Q ∈ P and X,Y ∈ X satisfying X|P
d
= Y |Q.
(E2) Uncertainty aversion: (X,Q)  (X,R) for any X ∈ X and R,Q ∈ S with R ⊆ Q.
(E3) Uncertainty bound: for any X ∈ X and Q ∈ S, there exists some P ∈ Q such that (X,P ) 
(X,Q).
(E4) Independence: for any P,Q ∈ P, any X,Y ∈ X satisfying X|Q
d
= Y |Q, and any α ∈ (0, 1) we
have (X,P )  (Y, P ) ⇐⇒ (X,αP + (1− α)Q)  (Y, αP + (1− α)Q).
(E5) Continuity: for any P,Q,R ∈ P and any X ∈ X , if (X,P )  (X,Q)  (X,R), then there
exists α ∈ [0, 1] such that (X,αP + (1− α)R) ≃ (X,Q).
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Proposition 3 illustrates a decision-theoretic characterization for the multi-prior expected utility.
The proof is based on Theorem 1 and the classic result of Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944).
Proposition 3. A preference  on X × S satisfies (E1)-(E5) if and only if it is a multi-prior
expected utility, i.e., there exists a function u : R → R such that
(X1,Q1)  (X2,Q2) ⇐⇒ min
P∈Q1
E




The strong law invariance (E1), which allows us to translate  to a preference on the set of
distributions on the real line, is crucial to the representation result. (E2) and (E3) are reasonable
for uncertainty-averse decision makers, and they correspond to (A1) and (A3), respectively, in the
framework of generalized risk measures. (E4) and (E5) correspond to the independence axiom and
the continuity axiom of Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), respectively.
6.3 Robust generalized risk measures
In addition to the worst-case generalized risk measure characterized in Theorem 1, another
popular form of risk measures involving multiple probability measures arises from the robust rep-
resentation of convex risk measures as in Example 1 (ii). More precisely, a traditional convex risk
measure ρ of Föllmer and Schied (2016) takes the form, for some Q ⊆ P,
ρ(X) = sup
P∈Q
{EP [X]− γ(P )}, X ∈ X , (6)
where γ : P → (−∞,∞] is a penalty function. Moreover, the variational preference of Maccheroni et al.
(2006) takes a similar form to (6) with the mean E replaced by an expected utility;5 see Exam-
ple 5 (ii). Inspired by (6) and the variational preference of Maccheroni et al. (2006), we consider
generalized risk measures with the form, for some ψ ∈ Σ,
Ψ(X|Q) = sup
P∈Q
{ψ(FX|P )− γ(P )}, (X,Q) ∈ X × 2
P . (7)
Clearly, if ψ is the mean functional, then (7) yields the traditional (convex) risk measure (6) for a
given Q. The generalized risk measure in (7) is loss law-invariant (B2) but neither scenario law-
invariant (B3) nor strongly law-invariant (B1). In order to characterize (7), we further impose the
following technical property, which says that the difference between the values of the core evaluated
on P and Q for identically distributed losses only depends on P and Q but not the random losses.
5In the setting of numerical representation of preferences, a negative sign needs to be applied to the generalized




= Y |Q and Z|P
d
=W |Q, then Ψ(X|P ) −Ψ(Y |Q) = Ψ(Z|P )−Ψ(W |Q).
Proposition 4. Let Ψ be a generalized risk measure. Ψ satisfies (A1), (A3), (B2) and (B5) if and
only if there exist a penalty function γ : P → R and some ψ ∈ Σ such that the representation (7)
holds.
Property (B5) can be roughly interpreted as that the magnitude of penalization for a given
scenario P is independent of the risky position X being evaluated. This property may be seen as
a bit artificial. Our characterization in Proposition 4 is mainly motivated by the great popularity
of the robust representation of convex risk measures and variational preferences, and we omit a
detailed discussion of the economic desirability or undesirability of (B5).
7 Concluding remarks
The new framework of generalized risk measures introduced in this paper allows for a unified
systemic formulation of measures of risk and uncertainty. Our results are only first attempts to
understand the new setting, and many further questions arise, especially regarding the interplay
between the risk variable X and the uncertainty collection Q for a generalized risk measures. Both
new economic and mathematical questions arise as the new functionals are more sophisticated than
traditionally studied objects by definition.
Worst-case generalized risk measures are characterized with a few axioms in Theorem 1. Another
popular way of handling model uncertainty is to use a weighted average of the risk evaluations. In
case of a finite collection Q, we can always use an arithmetic average as the risk evaluation, that







Certainly, such a formulation does not satisfy (A1) but it satisfies (A2) and (A3). In general, to
allow for different weights and infinite collections, one needs to associate each collection Q with a
measure as in (1) or the smooth ambiguity preference of Klibanoff et al. (2005) in Example 5 (iii).
Such a measure can either be pre-specified or treated as an input of Ψ, thus slightly extending our
framework.
We studied several most popular properties such as law-invariance, coherence and comonotonic
additivity, but many more properties on the new framework remain to be explored, as the literature
on traditional risk measures is very rich. In particular, the desirability of theoretic properties in
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risk management practice requires thorough study, as they may have different interpretation from
its traditional counterpart. For instance, additivity of the core may be sensible in our framework
(Theorem 3) and it nicely connects to the scenario-based margin calculation used by CME. However,
such a property is not desirable for traditional risk measures, as it essentially forces the risk measure
to collapse to the mean; see e.g., Liebrich and Munari (2021) and Chen et al. (2021) .
Finally, we mention that in some formulations of generalized risk measures, not all choices of
the input scenario Q are economically meaningful. In particular, for a given penalty function γ on
P, the core Ψ(X|P ) = EP [X]− γ(P ) in Example 1 (ii) or Ψ(X|P ) = EP [u(X)]− γ(P ) in Example
5 (ii) is not meant to be used directly with a single P ; the use of γ already implicitly implies that
there are some level of model uncertainty, and it is supposed to be coupled with the worst-case
operation. The value Ψ(X|P ) for a standalone P is thus difficult to interpret, and should not be
used for decision making without properly specifying the uncertainty collection Q. On the other
hand, such a situation does not happen in, for instance, the worst-case or average-type generalized
risk measures based on traditional risk measures, such as the worst-case ES.
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Embrechts, P., Puccetti, G., Rüschendorf, L., Wang, R. and Beleraj, A. (2014). An academic
response to Basel 3.5. Risks, 2(1), 25-48.
Embrechts, P., Liu, H. and Wang, R. (2018). Quantile-based risk sharing. Operations Research,
66(4), 936–949.
Embrechts, P., Schied, A. and Wang, R. (2021). Robustness in the optimization of risk measures.
Operations Research, forthcoming.
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A Proofs of all technical results
Proof of Proposition 1. For a fixed P , convexity of ESα(·|P ) is well-known since ESα(·|P ) is a
coherent risk measure; see e.g., Föllmer and Schied (2016). The non-convexity and non-concavity
of VaRα(·|P ) are due to the fact that VaRα(·|P ) has a non-convex and non-concave distortion
function; see e.g., Theorem 3 of Wang et al. (2020). For a fixed X, note that a mixture on scenarios
leads to a mixture of the distribution of X, that is, the distribution of X under λP + (1 − λ)Q is
λFX|P + (1− λ)FX|Q. Thus, concavity with respect to scenarios corresponds to mixture concavity
studied in Wang et al. (2020). Again, using Theorem 3 of Wang et al. (2020), ESα(X|·) is concave
and VaRα(X|·) is neither convex nor concave.
Proof of Theorem 1. (i) The “if” statement can be directly checked since (2) satisfies (A1)-(A2)
for a standard generalized risk measure. We show the “only if” statement below. Using
(A1), we have Ψ(X|Q) > Ψ(X|P ) for all P ∈ Q, which implies “>” in (2). Define sX =
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supP∈QΨ(X|P ). As sX is a constant random variable under every P ∈ Q, we have Ψ(X|P ) 6
sX = Ψ(sX |P ) for all P ∈ Q. Using (A2), we have Ψ(X|Q) 6 Ψ(sX |Q) = sX . Thus, “6” in
(2) follows.
(ii) For the “only if” statement, (A1) gives the “>” direction of (2) and the (A3) gives the “6”
direction of (2). The “if” statement is straightforward to check.
Proof of Theorem 2. The first statement can be directly checked. For the second statement, it
suffices to show (B2+B3)⇒(B1). Take P,Q ∈ P andX,Y ∈ X such that X|P
d
= Y |Q, and we denote
this common distribution by F . As explained above, we aim to show that Ψ(X|P ) = Ψ(Y |Q).
Let P ′ = (P + Q)/2 which is a probability measure dominating both P and Q. Since both
(Ω,F , P ) and (Ω,F , Q) are atomless, so is (Ω,F , P ′). Hence, there exist iid uniform [0, 1] random
variables U and V under P ′. Take an arbitrary x ∈ (0, 1) and define a probability measure R as
the regular conditional probability
R(A) = P ′(A|U = x), A ∈ F .
Note that R is a well-defined probability measure since the measurable space (Ω,F) is standard
Borel (see e.g., Theorem 5.1.9 of Durrett (2010)). It is clear that R is atomless since V is uniformly
distributed under R. Moreover, R and P ′ are mutually singular. Since P,Q ≪ P ′, we know that R
and P are mutually singular, and so are R and Q. By Remark 3.13 and Theorem 3.17 of Shen et al.
(2019), there exists a random variable Z such that the distribution of Z is F under both P and R.
Similarly, there exists a random variable W such that the distribution of W is F under both Q and













Ψ(X|P ) = Ψ(Z|P ) = Ψ(Z|R) = Ψ(W |R) = Ψ(W |Q) = Ψ(Y |Q).
Hence, Ψ satisfies (B1).
Proof of Proposition 2. For the proof of (i), an application of Theorem 1 shows that Ψ satisfies
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(A1) and (A3) if and only if
Ψ(X|Q) = sup
P∈Q
Ψ(X|P ), (X,Q) ∈ X × 2P . (8)
It remains to show that Ψ satisfies (B1) if and only if there exists a function ψ ∈ Σ such that
Ψ(X|P ) = ψ(FX|P ) for any (X,P ) ∈ X × P. The “if” statement can be checked directly.
Now we prove the “only if” statement. For any F ∈ M, there exists a random variable X ∈ X
and a probability measure P ∈ P such that F is the distribution of X under P . According to (B1),
Ψ(X|P ) is irrelevant to the selection of X and P . Hence, we define a functional ψ ∈ Σ via
ψ(F ) = Ψ(X|P ), F ∈ M. (9)
Combining (8) and (9), we complete the proof of (i). One can prove (ii) and (iii) similarly.
Proof of Theorem 3. It is straightforward to check that the risk measure Ψ defined by (3) satisfies
(A1), (A2), (B1), (C1)-(C4) and (C0). Next, we show that these properties pin down (3). Using
Theorem 1, it suffices to show that, with (B2), (C1) and (C0), the mapping X 7→ Ψ(X|P ) has to be
the expectation under P . It is a well-known result that a monotone, standard, law-invariant, and
additive functional has to the mean; see e.g., the proof of Lemma A.1 of Wang and Zitikis (2021).
Hence, these properties are enough to pin down (3).
Proof of Theorem 4. First, we show the equivalence (ii)⇔(iii). To show the direction (ii)⇒(iii),
based on (B2) and (C1)-(C5), for a fixed P ∈ P, we get, by Theorem 1, Lemma 2 and Theorem 3
of Wang et al. (2020), there exists an increasing concave function hP : [0, 1] → [0, 1] with hP (0) =
0 = 1− hP (1) such that
Φ(X|P ) =
∫
X d(hP ◦ P ), (X,P ) ∈ X × P. (10)
For every x ∈ [0, 1] and P,Q ∈ P, there exist A,B ∈ F with P (A) = Q(B) = x by Theorem 1 of
Delbaen (2012). Strong law invariance of Φ implies
Φ(1A|P ) = Φ(1B|Q) = hP (P (A)) = hQ(Q(B)).
Thus, hP (x) = hQ(x) for all x ∈ [0, 1]. This shows that hP does not depend on P , and writing
h = hP , (10) leads to (4).
To show the direction (iii)⇒(ii), for fixed P ∈ P, using Theorem 3 of Wang et al. (2020), Φ(·|P )
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is subadditive. Monotonicity, cash-additivity, positive homogeneity and comonotonic additivity
follow from Theorems 4.88 and 4.94 of Föllmer and Schied (2016). Therefore, Φ is coherent and
comonotonic-additive. Strong law invariance follows from the fact that X|P
d
= Y |Q implies
∫
X d(h ◦ P ) =
∫ 0
−∞
(h ◦ P (X > x)− 1) dx+
∫ ∞
0




(h ◦Q(Y > x)− 1) dx+
∫ ∞
0
h ◦Q(Y > x) dx =
∫
Y d(h ◦Q).
Next, we show (i)⇔(iii). To show (iii)⇒(i), as the other properties are straightforward to check,
we only show ambiguity sensitivity. Because of cash-additivity of (4), it suffices to check it for
X > 0. For X > 0 and P,Q ∈ P,
Ψ(X|λP + (1− λ)Q) =
∫








(λ(h ◦ P )(X > x) + (1− λ)(h ◦Q)(X > x)) dx
= λ
∫
X d(h ◦ P ) + (1− λ)
∫
X d(h ◦Q)
= λΨ(X|P ) + (1− λ)Ψ(X|Q).




h(P (1A > x)) dx =
∫ 1
0
h(P (1A > x)) dx =
∫ 1
0
h(P (A)) dx = h(P (A)).
For all A ∈ F and P,Q ∈ P such that P (A) = Q(A), we have
Ψ(1A|λP + (1− λ)Q) = h ((λP + (1− λ)Q)(A)) = h(P (A))
= λh(P (A)) + (1− λ)h(Q(A)) = λΨ(1A|P ) + (1− λ)Ψ(1A|Q).
To show (i)⇒(iii), by Theorem 1 and Lemma 2 of Wang et al. (2020), based on (B2), (C1),
(C2) and (C5), for a fixed P ∈ P, there exists an increasing function hP : [0, 1] → [0, 1] with
hP (0) = 0 = 1− hP (1) such that
Ψ(X|P ) =
∫
X d(hP ◦ P ), (X,P ) ∈ X × P. (11)
Also note that hP (x) = Ψ(1A|P ) for all P ∈ P and A ∈ F with P (A) = x. Further, note that for
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any P ∈ P and any t ∈ [0, 1],
Ψ(1{U6t}|P ) =
∫
1{U6t} d(hP ◦ P ) = hP (t).
Lyapunov’s convexity theorem (Theorem 5.5 of Rudin (1991)) states that the set R(P,Q) :=
{(P (A), Q(A)) : A ∈ F} is closed and convex. Hence, as (0, 0), (1, 1) ∈ R(P,Q), for every x ∈ [0, 1]
and P,Q ∈ P, there exists A ∈ F with P (A) = Q(A) = x. Hence, the second condition in (B4)
implies
hλP+(1−λ)Q(x) = λhP (x) + (1− λ)hQ(x). (12)
Assume P 6= Q. There exists B ∈ F such that P (B) > Q(B), which also implies P (Bc) <
Q(Bc). Therefore, R(P,Q) contains at least one point above the diagonal line and at least one
point below the diagonal line. Using Lyapunov’s convexity theorem again, since
(0, 0), (1, 1), (P (B), Q(B)), (P (Bc), Q(Bc)) ∈ R(P,Q),
for any ε ∈ (0, 12), there exists a “rectangle” set in R(P,Q), i.e., there exists some δ
′ > 0 such that
{
(x+ δ, x− δ) : x ∈ (ε, 1 − ε), δ ∈ (−δ′, δ′)
}
⊆ R(P,Q). (13)
Hence, for any δ ∈ (0, δ′), for any x ∈ (ε, 1− ε), there exists some Bδ ∈ F satisfying P (Bδ) = x+ δ






















It then follows from (12) that




(hQ(x)− hQ(x− δ)) >
1
δ
(hP (x+ δ)− hP (x)). (14)




(hP (x)− hP (x− δ)) >
1
δ
(hQ(x+ δ) − hQ(x)). (15)
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For any x ∈ (ε, 1 − ε) and δ ∈ (0, δ′) sufficiently small, subscribing x+ δ in (15), we have
1
δ
(hP (x+ δ) − hP (x)) >
1
δ
(hQ(x+ 2δ) − hQ(x+ δ)), (16)
Combining (14) and (16), for any x ∈ (ε, 1 − ε) and δ ∈ (0, δ′) sufficiently small, we have
1
δ
(hQ(x)− hQ(x− δ)) >
1
δ
(hQ(x+ 2δ) − hQ(x+ δ)), (17)
which implies that hQ is concave on (ε, 1 − ε). As ε ∈ (0,
1
2) is arbitrary, we have hQ is concave on
(0, 1). Concavity implies that hQ is absolutely continuous on (0, 1). Similarly, hP is also concave
and hence absolutely continuous on (0, 1).







hP (x) for a.e. x ∈ (0, 1).






hQ(x) for a.e. x ∈ (0, 1),






hQ(x) for a.e. x ∈ (0, 1). (18)
Using the Newton-Leibnitz formula, for any x ∈ (0, 1], we have










hQ(t) dt = hQ(1−)− hQ(x). (19)
We proceed to prove that hP (1) = hP (1−) for any P ∈ P. It is clear that hP (1) > hP (1−)





hP (x), x ∈ [0, 1);
hP (1−), x = 1.
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Hence, for any X ∈ X satisfying 0 6 X 6 1, we have
Ψ(X|P ) =
∫
X dhP ◦ P
=
∫
X d(hP (1)− h̃P (1)) ◦ P +
∫
X dh̃P ◦ P
= (hP (1)− h̃P (1)) · ess-inf(X|P ) +
∫
X dh̃P ◦ P
= (hP (1)− h̃P (1)) · ess-inf(X|P ) +
∫ 1
0
h̃P ◦ P (X > x) dx
6 (hP (1)− h̃P (1)) · ess-inf(X|P ) + h̃P (1).
(20)
For any λ ∈ [0, 1], let X be a random variable satisfying X|P ∼ Bernoulli(λ). On one hand,
according to (20), we have
Ψ(X|P ) 6 h̃P (1). (21)
On the other hand, we define two probability measures: Q(·) = P (·|X = 0) and R(·) = P (·|X =
1). In fact, we have P = (1− λ)Q+ λR. Hence, Q and R are mutual singular with Q(X = 0) = 1
and R(X = 1) = 1. Hence, Ψ(X|Q) = 0 and Ψ(X|R) = 1. According to (B4), we have
Ψ(X|P ) > (1− λ)Ψ(X|Q) + λΨ(X|R) = λ. (22)
Combining (21) and (22), we have h̃P (1) > λ for any λ ∈ [0, 1], which implies that hP (1−) =
h̃P (1) = 1 = hP (1).
Finally, combining with (19), we have hP = hQ on (0, 1]. Hence, together with hP (0) = hQ(0) =
0, we have hP = hQ. This shows that hP does not depend on P , and we write h = hP . As h is
concave on (0, 1), h(1−) = h(1) and h(0+) > h(0), we know that h is concave on [0, 1]. Hence, we
complete the proof of (4).
Proof of Proposition 3. It is straightforward to check that the multi-prior expected utility in (5)
satisfies (E1)-(E5). Below we will show the representation (5) from (E1)-(E5).
By (E1), to compare (X,P ) with (Y,Q), it suffices to compare the distributions FX|P and FY |Q as
elements ofM, the set of distributions on R. Hence, the restriction of  to {(X,P ) : X ∈ X , P ∈ P}
is described equivalently by a binary relation ∗ on M, via
(X,P )  (Y,Q) ⇐⇒ FX|P 
∗ FY |Q.
By letting FX|P = F , FY |P = G and FX|Q = FY |Q = H, we can translate (E4) into the following
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property: For any F,G,H ∈ M and α ∈ (0, 1), it holds
F ∗ G⇐⇒ αF + (1− α)H ∗ αG+ (1− α)H;
this is the independence axiom of Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) on ∗. Similarly, (E5)
can be translated into the continuity axiom of Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) on ∗. Using
the Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility theorem, there exists a function u : R → R such that
(X,P )  (Y,Q) ⇐⇒ FX|P 
∗ FY |Q ⇐⇒ E
P [u(X)] 6 EQ[u(Y )]. (23)
Next, we consider two general objects (X1,Q1) ∈ X ×S and (X2,Q2) ∈ X ×S. First, by (E2) and
(E3), there exist Q∗1 ∈ Q1 and Q
∗
2 ∈ Q2 such that
(X1, Q
∗
1) ≃ (X1,Q) and (X2, Q
∗
2) ≃ (X2,Q2)
Moreover, by (E2), we have (X1, Q
∗
1) ≃ (X1,Q1)  (X1, Q) for all Q ∈ Q1. By using (23), we have
E
Q∗
1 [u(X1)] 6 E
Q[u(X1)] for all Q ∈ Q1.
Thus, EQ
∗
1 [u(X1)] = minQ∈Q1 E
Q[u(X1)]. Similarly, E
Q∗




1 [u(X1)] 6 E
Q∗
2 [u(X2)]. By using (23) again, we have
(X1, Q
∗
1)  (X2, Q) for all Q ∈ Q2.
Using (E3), this implies (X1,Q1) ≃ (X1, Q
∗
1)  (X2,Q2). Reverting the positions of (X1,Q1) and
(X2,Q2), we obtain that (5) holds true.
Proof of Proposition 4. Proposition 2 shows that Ψ satisfies (A1), (A3) and (B2) if and only if there
exists {ψP : P ∈ P} ⊆ Σ such that
Ψ(X|Q) = sup
P∈Q
Ψ(X|P ), (X,Q) ∈ X × 2P
and
Ψ(X|P ) = ψP (FX|P ), (X,P ) ∈ X × P. (24)
It remains to show that Ψ satisfies (B5) if and only if there exists γ : P → (−∞,∞] and ψ ∈ Σ
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such that
Ψ(X|P ) = ψP (FX|P ) = ψ(FX|P )− γ(P ), (X,P ) ∈ X × P. (25)
The “if” statement can be checked directly. Now we proceed to prove the “only if” statement.
Assume that (B5) holds. For any X,Y,Z,W ∈ X and P,Q ∈ P satisfying X|P
d
= Y |Q and
Z|P
d
= W |Q, according to (24) we have ψP (FX|P ) − ψQ(FY |Q) = ψP (FZ|P ) − ψQ(FW |Q). Write
F1 = FX|P = FY |Q and F2 = FZ|P = FW |Q. Hence, for any F1, F2 ∈ M and P,Q ∈ P, we have
ψP (F1)− ψQ(F1) = ψP (F2)− ψQ(F2),
which means ψP (F ) − ψQ(F ) is a constant for any F ∈ M. That is, there exists a functional
g : P × P → R such that
ψP (F )− ψQ(F ) = g(P,Q), P,Q ∈ P, F ∈ M.
Fix P ∈ P and set Q = δ0, the Dirac measure at zero. Then
ψP (F ) = ψδ0(F ) + g(P, δ0), F ∈ M.
Define ψ(·) = ψδ0(·) and γ(·) = −g(·, δ0). We have
ψP (F ) = ψ(F )− γ(P ), F ∈ M. (26)
Since (26) holds for any P ∈ P,
ψP (F ) = ψ(F )− γ(P ), (P,F ) ∈ P ×M.
For any X ∈ X and P ∈ P, we consider F = FX|P and hence have
Ψ(X|P ) = ψP (FX|P ) = ψ(FX|P )− γ(P ), (X,P ) ∈ X × P,
which is exactly (25).
31
